credit:
Guardian
As China
rises, so does Japanese nationalism
Japan is stuck in its past, and its refusal to come to
terms with it threatens to define its future and that of
the whole of east Asia
by Martin Jacques Thursday November 17, 2005
The past year might be described as the moment time of
China's rise. Of course its rise long predates these
years, but this fact has suddenly been recognized
worldwide, well beyond the global elite. It is now part of
the popular common sense, not simply in Europe but
everywhere; indeed, Europe has been relatively tardy in
this process. The buzz surrounding Hu Jintao's visit is
part of this picture.
The phenomenon is even evident in China itself, where the past two
years have seen a much wider awareness of both the fact and
implications of the country's rise. In the face of this changed
consciousness, it is inevitable that new stances will be adopted
and new policy positions struck around the world. This is already
happening in Japan, notwithstanding its typically understated tone.
Developments there can only be described as ominous. While Europe
still thinks of itself as somehow central to the future, east Asia
is where the future will be played out. It is in that context that
we should see the import of current trends in Japan.
When
Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese prime minister, secured his
dramatic and overwhelming victory in September's general election,
its significance was generally interpreted as a victory for his
programme of privatisation and deregulation. This, however, is
secondary. Far more important to Japan's future is Koizumi's
implicit and incipient nationalism. This was demonstrated again on
October 17 with his latest visit to the Yasukuni shrine, where
class A war criminals are honoured, despite the opposition of China
and South Korea and the wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations in
China earlier this year.
Little is made too explicit in Japanese society, but the new
cabinet, which Koizumi announced last week, spoke volumes about
both his intentions and likely future trends in Japan. The two top
positions, chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister, were given
to Shinzo Abe, the man most likely to succeed Koizumi when his term
finishes next September, and Taro Aso respectively. Both are
rightwing nationalists and both, like Koizumi, are regular visitors
to Yasukuni. This is the first time that the three key positions in
the cabinet have been occupied by such figures. The previous
cabinet secretary, who had opposed Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni,
was dropped from the cabinet and the former foreign minister, who
did not visit Yasukuni, lost his position.
One might think that this is to read too much into such visits
to the shrine. On the contrary, they are symbolic acts, an
expression of how Japan's past and future should be seen, and as
such a deliberate, if coded, signal to the Japanese. Nor are these
visits naive or innocent in the message they send to China and
South Korea. Koizumi may express the view that they do not give
offence to these countries but he knows that they do. And this,
indeed, is their very intention. The more these countries protest,
the more likely it is that Koizumi will continue to visit the
shrine. He is laying down a marker - for the Japanese and to the
Chinese and Koreans. Japan's future is already beginning to take
shape.
The causes of growing Japanese nationalism may be diverse, but
they are increasingly driven by one overwhelming factor: a fear of
the rise of China. That is the only way the behaviour of Koizumi
and the other leading lights in the Liberal Democratic party can be
understood. It could be different. China, widely credited with
having pulled Japan out of its long-running recession, represents
an enormous economic opportunity for Japan, and is already Japan's
largest trading partner. But far more powerful forces than mere
economics are at work. Ever since the Meiji restoration in 1868,
Japan has turned its back on Asia in general and China in
particular: its pattern of aggression from 1895 onwards and the
colonies that resulted were among the consequences.
To engage with China requires Japan to come to terms with its
past, and Koizumi's visits to the shrine represent a symbolic
refusal to do so. Japan is stuck in its past, and its past now
threatens to define its future and that of east Asia. Even during
the postwar period, when Japan dominated east Asia economically and
China was weak and self-absorbed, it never had an influence
commensurate with its economic strength. The reason was simple: its
failure to atone for its past and embrace a new kind of
relationship with its wronged and distrustful neighbours. If Japan
could not do it then, it is even less likely to do it in the face
of a resurgent China that is rapidly displacing it as the economic
and political fulcrum of east Asia.
The broader significance of the shift within the cabinet, and
the Liberal Democratic party more widely, should not be
underestimated. Japan remains a profoundly hierarchical society.
Apart from a brief few months a decade ago, the Liberal Democrats
have continuously held power more or less since the war. This lies
in a much longer tradition in which the ruling elite has enjoyed an
extraordinary continuity as the determinant and arbiter of Japan's
course. If anything, that situation has been strengthened over the
past decade with the effective collapse of the Socialist party,
once the second-largest party, and the marginalisation of the
Communist party; both fiercely opposed Japanese nationalism.
The rise of Japanese nationalism should be seen alongside
another trend: the increasingly close links between Japan and the
US. Earlier this year Japan affirmed, for the first time, its
willingness to support the US in the event of a conflict over
Taiwan. It has also agreed to work with the US to develop and
finance a missile-defence system whose intention is clearly the
containment of China. It is not difficult to see the early signs of
a new cold war in east Asia, with Japan and the US on one side and
China on the other. It does not have to be like this. If Japan
grasped the nettle of its past and ushered in a new era in its
relationship with China, South Korea and the rest of the region, it
would surely play a major role in the evolution of the most
economically powerful region in the world. Instead it looks
increasingly likely that Japan will remain in splendid isolation
from its continent, weighed down by fear, suspicion and anxiety
that its neighbours, above all China, will seek to lord it over
Japan in the way that Japan did over them for over a century. Its
only solace will lie in looking across the Pacific to the US, which
is likely only to intensify its isolation. Japan faces an extremely
uncomfortable future.
Martin Jacques ([email protected]) is
a visiting professor at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, Japan
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